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Until October 1, 1983, hospitals were reimbursed by a retrospective 
payment system. This cost-based reimbursement provided no incentives 
for the hospital industry to operate in a productive or efficient 
manner. As a result, hospitalization costs soared and exceeded overall 
yearly inflation by as much as three times. On October 1, 1983, the 
Federal Government instituted a Prospective Payment System for hospital 
reimbursement for Medicare patients. Hospitals received a fixed payment 
based on the patient's diagnosis. Diagnostic Related Groups combined 
all diagnoses that utilized similar medical resources and the fixed 
payment was based on that resource utilization. The Prospective Payment 
System with Diagnostic Related Group reimbursement was designed to 
decrease the accelerating cost of hospitalization and to force the 
hospital industry to become more productive and efficient in providing 
patient care. This study compares hospital productivity in the years 
prior to and after the implementation of the Prospective Payment System 




The productivity and efficiency levels of the hospital industry 
have been under attack for a number of years. Wide variations have 
existed across communities in lengths of stay by diagnosis and in the 
use of hospital personnel.'*' The purpose of this paper is to determine 
what effect, if any, the Prospective Payment System, introduced by the 
Federal Government for Medicare patients on October 1, 1983, has had on 
hospital productivity. Productivity measurements will be developed and 
comparing the productivity (and efficiency) levels of each year from 
1965, when Medicare was first introduced, through 1988 will demonstrate 
how the hospital industry has responded to a fixed reimbursement payment 
system.
Prior to October 1, 1983, The Federal Government, insurance
intermediaries, and the general public had been increasingly concerned
about the accelerating and spiraling of hospital costs and the
ineffectiveness of the Retrospective Payment System (RPS) to contain
them. Under this system, the hospitalization expenses that were paid by
Third Party payers which included Blue Cross, Medicare, and Medicaid,
were based on hospital costs and on the percentage of patients treated
2for each insurance group. In 1982, as a result, at least in part, of 
the exploitation of the Restrospective Payment System, the inflation 
rate in the hospital sector was three times the overall national 
inflation rate. The hospital industry had an inflation rate of 12.6%
6
while overall inflation was 3.9%. In addition, health care's percentage
3of the Gross National Product in 1981 was 9.8% -- up from 6.0% in 1965.
Therefore, on October 1, 1983 the Federal Government began 
phasing-in the Prospective Payment System (PPS) which incorporated 
Diagnostic Related Groups (DRGs) as a cost containment measure.
Hospitals would now be reimbursed based on the patient's DRG which 
delineated anticipated resource usage and a predetermined payment for 
each patient treated. On October 1, 1989, a major Third Party Payer, 
Blue Cross, also began reimbursing hospitals under essentially the same 
Prospective Payment System. This new prospective payment system was 
implemented to create an incentive for hospitals to control costs, 
become more productive, and run more efficiently - the very things that 
the retrospective payment system had failed to do.
Before determining what effect the Prospective Payment System has 
had on hospital productivity, let's first review how the Retrospective 
Payment System came into existence and then how both the Retrospective 
Payment System and Prospective Payment System reimbursed hospitals.
7
REFERENCES
1. Feldstein, Paul J., Health Care Economics, 3rd ed. John Whiley
& Sons, New York: 1988, pp. 8-9.
2.  , Annual Survey of Hospitals, 1986, American
Hospital Association, 1988. Medicare = 37.9%; Medicaid = 
10.9%; Third Party= 32.2%; Self-pay = 8.5%; Other = 10.4%. 
Flint: Medicare = 34.4%; Medicaid = 13.0%; Third Party =
42.2%; Self-pay = 3.7%; Other = 6.7%.
3. Schweiker, Richard S., Secretary, Dept, of Health and Human
Services, Report to Congress on Hospital Prospective Payment 
for Medicare, December, 1982; p: 1.
8
CHAPTER ONE: THE EVOLUTION OF THE RETROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM 
1875 to 1900
Prior to 1875, the general hospital as it is known today was
non-existent. The destitute and the destitute ill who had no family to
care for them were cared for in institutions known as poorhouses and
almshouses. Illnesses were treated mainly in patients' homes and
physicians' offices.'*'
After 1875, the modern hospital system began its infancy as the
result of two specific medical-technical discoveries - antisepsis and
anesthesia. Antisepsis greatly reduced the problem of infection due to
surgery and anesthesia made surgery relatively painless. Thus, surgery,
because most of it had to be performed in a hospital, became the medical
specialty that initiated the growth of the modern hospital.
Additionally, by the turn of the century, the volume of medical patients
receiving treatment in the hospital setting also began to grow.'*'
As the health care industry grew, it needed more money and
resources compared to other components that comprised the gross national
product. New money was needed because of the tremendous increase in
surgical procedures and to cover the capital financing of hospitals.
The middle and upper classes were driving a demand for the surgical
procedures that had been perfected "by trial and error on charity
patients who were the sole source of 'clinical material'".'*' In 1875
the United States had few established hospitals. By 1900 there were
14,000 recognized general hospitals functioning.
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Voluntary community boards and church bodies established most of 
the original hospitals with capital funds being supplied by millionaires 
and multi-millionaire philanthropists. Operating funds came from 
private pay patients and public coffers. Physicians, particularly those 
who wanted to be surgeons, made arrangements with the hospitals to bring 
in their private pay patients who paid both the hospital's charges and 
the physician's fees. In return, because the hospital was providing the 
physicians with a free place in which to practice medicine, the 
physicians agreed to provide the destitute with free care. Thus, 
hospitals survived with approximately two-thirds of their income coming 
from fees paid by private patients and the remaining third from public
funds, charities, and philanthropy (respectable deficits were not
,  1 uncommon).
1900 to 1930
By 1909, hospital care was becoming difficult to pay for. The
American Medical Association (AMA) noted that a stratified health system
was emerging where the poor received free care, the rich could afford to
pay for it, but the cost of hospital care was getting out of the reach
2of the broad middle class. Between 1916 and 1920, sixteen states in
conjunction with the American Association for Labor Legislation (AALL)
formulated and submitted to the Federal Legislature a model bill for
compulsory health insurance. The bill was supported by "social
reformers from the ranks of academic economists, social workers,
sociologists and a few sympathetic physicians."'*' Even the AMA set up a
study commission to investigate the problem of high costs of health 
3services.
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However, nothing came of it because the middle class was not
sufficiently aroused or organized. In fact, Samuel Gompers, head of the
American Federation of Labor (AFL), was openly hostile due to his
distrust of government. World War I was underway and the discovery that
Bismarck had made health insurance compulsory for Germany in 1883 didn't
help matters any. The AMA and drug companies went on the offensive with
a major propaganda campaign and easily won because the proponents did
3 4not have a political base. '
For the next ten to fifteen years the demand for personal health 
services increased and the people of the United States bought it without 
the help of government or private insurance. During this time the 
health services infrastructure as we know it today began to take shape: 
university education for physicians and dentists as opposed to only an 
apprenticeship, hospital based schools of nursing, the emergence of 
allied medical personnel, voluntary hospitals, private pharmacies, etc."*"
1930 to 1965
The Great Depression of the 1930s not only changed lifestyles and
the consumption of goods and services, it directly influenced hospital
admission rates as well as payments from private patients - both
decreased.'*' Both hospitals and the middle class, as well as the poor,
became financially hard pressed. This depressed economic time helped to
spawn the birth of private health insurance:
The 1930s saw the start of the hospital-sponsored prepayment 
plans, eventually known as Blue Cross. Although such plans 
would have undoubtedly come about without the Great Depres­
sion, their development was likely hastened by it. Hospital 
stays had become relatively costly and lent themselves to the 
application of the insurance principle. A relatively predic­
table number of people would incur hospital expenses. Con­
currently and separately, because the hospitals and physicians
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services were two separate interests and enterprises, prepay­
ment plans for physician services in the hospital, mainly 
surgery, began to appear in the latter 1930s as well. These 
plans were sponsored by state medical societies and later 
became known as Blue Shield plans. Again, surgical care, 
which was relatively costly, lent itself to the insurance 
principle. (1)
During the Depression the government continued to care for the
health needs of the poor and eventually the states entered into a shared
program with the Federal Government. While formulating the Social
Security Act of 1935, health insurance was considered but not included
because it was felt to be too controversial. Health care reformers
pressed to include health insurance, but when this became known, "the
AMA raised such a storm that it was not included in the bill that went 
1to Congress."
During the 1940s, and based on Blue Cross' and Blue Shield's 
experience, private insurance companies realized that hospital care and 
surgery were insurable and that their costs could be predicted through 
the use of actuary tables. (And that they could make a profit providing 
health care insurance!) During World War II the government decreed that 
health insurance benefits were not considered as an increase in wages. 
This amounted to an indirect public subsidy because the portion paid by 
employers was tax exempt as a business expense. Furthermore, because 
employers often required employees to sign up for health insurance 
benefits as a condition of employment, this form of compulsory health 
insurance as demanded by employers was acceptable, whereas it would have 
been an extremely controversial issue had the government required it of 
employers.̂
By 1952 over one-half of the U.S. population was covered by some 
form of voluntary health insurance - mainly hospital care and physician
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services in the hospital. Blue Cross and the government had established 
contractual arrangements with hospitals and paid the hospitals' costs of 
caring for their subscribers. They did not pay hospital charges. 
However, there were no such negotiations with insurance companies other 
than Blue Cross or the government and they as well as patients without 
insurance, paid what the hospital charged. (Physicians negotiated 
generous fee schedules with Blue Shield and did not negotiate at all 
with private insurance companies.) As a result, hospital admissions 
between the 1930s and 1960s increased from 90 per 1,000 population to 
145. (The percentage of the population who saw a physician in one year
increased from 39 to 65 percent.) The supply of physicians and hospital
beds also increased but did not keep up with the demand.
Until 1965 the Retrospective Payment System continued to operate as
described with few exceptions. Blue Cross and the government continued 
to reimburse hospitals their costs to care for their respective 
subscribers while private insurance companies and private pay patients 
paid actual hospital charges. There were, however, a couple of noteable 
accurances during this time period. First, in the 1940s Congress passed 
the Hospital Construction Act (commonly known as the Hill-Burton Act) 
which gave a one-time grant to both public and voluntary hospitals. The 
result was that the number of hospitals increased and existing hospitals 
began to expand their physical plants. Needless to say, Hill-Burton was 
strongly endorsed by the American Hospital Association, the American 
Medical Association, and labor organizations.
Second, the influence of Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO) 
began to be felt as Kaiser Permanente in the West and the Health 
Insurance Plan of Greater New York (HIP) came into existence. HMOs
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represented a major change from the solo practice and fee-for-service
type of medical delivery. They were group practice prepayment plans
that employed a wide range of physicians who were paid a salary and
provided a full spectrum of services. The medical community's initial
opposition to HMOs was fierce but later subsided as HMOs seemed to
1attract only about 4% of the population.
During this time national health insurance had been placed on the
back burner. Its proponents, however, began to realize that the aged
had become a burden on voluntary health insurance and the broad
middle-income segment of the population. The AMA and the AHA had
maintained strong opposition to national health insurance fearing
government involvement in an essentially lucrative and private
enterprise and the possible loss of the fee-for-service payment
structure if government paid health care bills directly. Both
organizations lobbied Congress unmercifully and mounted a public
campaign against the "evils" of "socialized medicine." (The mood of the
country was "anti-socialized anything" as the Cold War with Russia was
escalating.) However, once Congress capitulated and maintained the
fee-for-service structure similar to that of Blue Cross and Blue Shield
and agreed to intermediaries paying the bills (usually Blue Cross and
Blue Shield) the stage was set to include Medicare (health care for the
aged) and Medicaid (health care for the poor - often referred to as
13 5Title XIV) in the Social Security Act of 1965. ' '
Medicare was a federal program and Medicaid was a shared 
federal-state program, as they still are. Medicare took 
the costs of the care of the aged off the backs of volun­
tary health insurance and families with aged and ailing 
relatives. Medicaid assuaged the national conscience re­
garding the poor and eased the pressure on the shaky 
revenue structure of the states. The states, however, 
still had to raise more money to match the federal portion.
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By then, private and nonprofit insurace agencies were 
supplying 42 percent of the charges of day-to-day oper­
ations of the hospitals and 30 percent of physicians' 
services, and government was paying for 38 percent of the 
hospital charges and 6 percent of the physicians' services, 
mainly for surgery. The stage was set for a spectacular 
increase in both price and usage. There were no built-in 
controls on cost. The health services enterprise had become 
accustomed to being paid what it asked, and the funding 
sources did not demur because employees, employers, and 
Congress did not demur either. From 1950 to 1965, expend­
itures as a percent of gross national product rose from 
4.6 to 5.9. Expenditures per capita for all services rose 
from $78 to $198 without accounting for inflation, which 
was quite moderate during that period. The private insur­
ance agencies and the government teamed up, as it were, to 
assure a health service where cost would be of no conse­
quence . (1)
1965 to 1983
In the late 1960s, government, employers, and labor unions, as well
as insurance companies and prepayment agencies - the big buyers of
services - began to be really concerned about the rising expenditures
for health services. What was most alarming was the pace of the
increase. Based on the consumer price index, health care costs were
rising faster than the economy as a whole. In fact, hospital
expenditures alone were rising at the alarming rate of 15 percent 
1annually. The buyers of services were interested in keeping insurance 
premiums and reimbursements low while the general public was concerned 
about reducing out-of-pocket expenses. Providers said the increase in 
expenditures was justified due to increased use and improved services. 
They also noted rising labor costs in a labor intensive industry. While 
there appeared to be general agreement that the level of expenditures 
was too high, no one seemed to acknowledge what was an appropriate level 
of expenditures . ^
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The past practice of simply paying what the providers asked began 
to be seriously questioned. There was an intense concern with how to 
manage the health service industry so that providers would know what 
they were selling and buyers would know what they were purchasing. The 
payment mechanism appeared to be the means to manage the system. "Three 
methods to do so were to emerge, largely in the following order: 
monitoring of physician decision making in hospitals, control of 
hospital beds, and control of hospital reimbursement rates."'*'
HMOs began to be viewed as not simply a means of saving money, 
although this was an acknowledged consideration, but as a means of 
providing high quality and comprehensive health services efficiently and 
conveniently. Both federal and state governments began to facilitate 
the expansion of HMOs despite considerable opposition from the existing 
medical community.
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (now the 
Department of Health and Human Services) began to fund scores of 
hospital planning councils that were established in major metropolitan 
areas and sponsored by local hospitals. The aim of these councils was 
to establish inter-hospital relationships and cooperation - and of 
course, to save money. Hospitals had used size and costly, 
sophisticated services in order to obtain prestige and attract 
physicians. This competition resulted in a gross duplication of 
expensive services and equipment. Hospitals in close proximity to one 
another provided open heart surgery, computed axial tomography (CAT) 
scanners, a wide variety of intensive services, etc., and almost all 
hospitals had maternity beds despite a declining birth rate. This 
duplication of services and equipment frequently caused individual
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hospitals to have fully staffed but under-utilized units resulting in 
inefficient use of personnel, space, and equipment. Local hospital 
situations were the subject of inter-hospital discussions as the 
councils attempted to be an information clearinghouse - assuming that 
the hospitals would recognize their mutual self-interests and survival. 
There is, however, no evidence that these councils achieved a reduction 
in either the duplication of services or a stabilization of the number 
of beds. As long as hospitals continued to be reimbursed for their 
costs of operations there was no incentive to discontinue their 
prestigious efforts.'*'
The failure of these councils to achieve their stated goals of 
decreased resource utilization lead to the establishment of the Federal 
Comprehensive Health Planning (CHP) program. It was directed at 
hospital facility planning and incorporated many of the hospital 
planning councils as agents of the state. Concurrently, an additional 
federal endeavor, also through the states, was the Regional Medical 
Program (RMP). This program concerned itself with the delivery of 
costly services to patients with heart disease, strokes (CVAs), cancer, 
and related ailments attempting to relate physicians to medical schools 
and major medical centers. It was hoped that physicians would benefit 
from the latest knowledge about these diseases causing a better 
integration of physicians' services and more rapid referrals of 
patients. However, neither program came even close to accomplishing its 
goals.
"In the meantime, [hospital] expenditures increased apace; the 
internal and external dynamics of this tremendous growth enterprise was 
indeed awesome."'*' The Federal Government established commissions to
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study hospital effectiveness and medical care for the poor (Medicaid)
but they disbanded in confusion and frustration. At best they were
ambiguous toward planning and while distressed at the prospect of
additional government intervention they were at a loss to suggest
anything else. However, the Medicaid report did suggest that one means
of containing rising health expenditures was to create competition
1between delivery options, such as HMOs and Perferred Provider 
Organizations (PPOs).
Despite the fear of the above mentioned commissions concerning 
additional government involvment in the hospital industry, the 
government did exactly that - become more involved. Numerous state 
legislatures began passing laws requiring the issuance of certificates 
of need (CON) before a hospital could increase its bed capacity, build a 
new hospital, or renovate an old one. In an obvious effort at 
controlling supply, CONs had to be approved by a state agency. The 
states also began to place a control on price as they passed legislation 
to regulate hospital rate setting.
The Social Security Act of 1965, which established Medicare and 
Medicaid, provided for a review of hospital utilization. Congress, in 
another attempt at containing costs, passed legislation requiring 
utilization review of hospital care. Professional Standards Review 
Organizations (PSROs), made up of physicians, were to review physician 
decision making on an areawide basis. "From the medical profession's 
viewpoint this was a radical step."^ In 1974, Congress also passed the 
Health Planning Act (PL 93-641). It mandated the creation of more than 
200 health planning areas to be administered by health service agencies 
(HSAs). The majority of the HSA's board of governors was to be
18
comprised of consumers. The function of the HSA was to review the
"...appropriateness of hospital construction, distribution, renovation,
and the purchasing policies of hospitals regarding expensive equipment.
Further, [they] were to measure health needs in their areas in a master
plan according to federal guidelines to be passed on to counterpart
state and federal agencies for review and consideration."'*'
Congressional intent was to place need determination and 
control of facility construction at the local level. Needs, 
as determined by health service agencies, would then be sub­
mitted to upper levels of state and federal government.
Upper levels of government could then react in terms of 
their funds and priorities and work out compromises.
Congress and perhaps even the bureaucracy were exceed­
ingly chary of imposing a blueprint on the states and 
local areas, preferring to set up fairly loose guide­
lines for discussion. It was apparently Congress' in­
tent to put a planning apparatus in place before the 
enactment of some form of nation health insurance so 
as to have a framework in which to implement such leg­
islation and to have a handle on costs and the direc­
tion of development of the personal health services. 
Certificate of need and rate control, although state 
level functions, were in effect turned over to the 
health service agencies for decision. The state norm­
ally respects health service agencies' decisions, and 
both state and federal governments can withhold pay­
ment from hospitals that do not comply. Even so, the 
current planning apparatus does not seem to have a firm 
place in national political policy... The states, of 
course, may do as they please to continue supporting 
the health service agencies using state funds. (1)
As the 1970s drew to a close, government increased their support of
HMOs in an yet another effort to contain the escalation of health care
costs. HMOs attempt to monitor physician decision making and have fixed
premiums for comprehensive services. They utilize hospital services
less than the mainstream fee-for-service system and therefore tend to 
1 7cost less. ' Government encouraged, even mandated, that employers 
provide employed groups a choice of plans (the choice was to include
HMOs if available in the area) with the hope that competition between
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options would slow the rise in health care costs. Needless to say, the
AMA, the AHA, and local medical societies strongly opposed this
increased attention to HMOs and attempted to use local health service
agencies to prevent the expansion of HMOs. Despite a considerable
amount of propaganda, HMOs did expand and enter new marketplaces.
However, through 1983 they attracted only 13.7 million people or about
6 V6% of the population. '
Regardless of Professional Standards Review Organizations, 
certificates of need, rate review, and planning, the personal health 
services economy still grew, expenditures continued to rise, and 
attempts to manage the system did not have much effect. Between 1965 
and 1983, the percent of the gross national product spent for all health 
services increased from 6.0% to 10.5% as depicted in Table 1-1 and 
Figure 1-1 below.
TABLE 1-1 - HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURES AS A PERCENT OF GNP
(in billions of dollars)
HEALTH CARE
YEAR GNP EXPENDITURES % GNP
1965 629.1 37.7 6.0
1970 992.7 75.0 7.5
1971 1,077.6 83 . 5 7.7
1972 1,185.9 94.0 7.9
1973 1,326.4 103.4 7.8
1974 1,434.2 116. 1 8.1
1975 1,598.4 132.7 8.3
1976 1,718.0 150.8 8.8
1977 1,918.3 169.9 8.9
1978 2,163.9 189.7 8.8
1979 2,417.8 214.7 8.9
1980 2,732.0 248. 1 9.1
1981 3,052.6 287.0 9.4
1982 3,166.0 323 .6 10.2
1983 3,405.7 357.2 10. 5
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1965 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83
Year
Sources: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1985,
105th ed. U.S. Department of Congress; Bureau of
the Census, Washington, D.C.: 1985 
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1989, 
109th ed. U.S. Department of Congress; Bureau of
the Census, Washington, D.C.: 1989
The payment concept that the American Hospital Association has 
favored in the design of payment systems for its member hospitals was 
the elimination of any incentive for hospitals to engage in price 
competition. When hospitals started Blue Cross. Blue Cross plans were 
required to offer their subscribers a service benefit plan. A service 
benefit plan provides the hospitalized patient with services rather than 
dollars, which is characteristic of an indemnity plan. By guaranteeing
payment to the hospital for the services used by the patient, the
service benefit policy removes any incentive the patient (or the 
hospital) may have regarding the cost of hospitalization. Since the 
patient does not have to make any out-of-pocket payments, the 
prospective patient has no disincentive to enter the most expensive 
hospital, which may or may not be the highest quality hospital. Under a
21
service benefit policy, hospitals cannot compete for patients on the
basis of price. When Medicare was started, the method of Medicare
reimbursement to hospitals (based on each hospital's cost plus 2 percent
for capital improvements; capital improvements were a pass through with
Blue Cross) also provided no incentive for patients to select less
7costly, more efficient hospitals. Nor did it provide hospitals an 
incentive to contain costs or operate efficiently. This concept of 
hospital reimbursement resulted in the hospital price index running far 
ahead of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) as shown in Table 1-2 and Figure 
1-2 below.
TABLE 1-2 - HOSPITAL PRICE INDEX vs. CONSUMER PRICE INDEX
YEAR HPI CPI YEAR HPI CPI
1965 6.6 1.3 1976 14.4 5.8
1970 14.7 5.7 1977 13.8 6.5
1971 13.2 4.3 1978 11.9 7.6
1972 13.4 3.3 1979 11.3 11.5
1973 7.6 6.2 1980 13.3 13.5
1974 11.2 10.9 1981 16.2 10.2
1975 17.6 9.1 1982 13.1 6.0
1983 12.7 3.0













1965 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83
Year
—  HPI —  CPI
Source: Feldstein, Paul J., Health Care Economics, 3rd ed. John 
Whiley & Sons, New York: 1988.
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The second concept underlying hospitals1 preferred method of
payment was to engage in price discrimination, or in other words, to
charge different prices to different payors. Hospitals can thus charge
each payor based on their willingness or ability to pay. Charging Blue
Cross for costs essentially gave Blue Cross a discount (often as high as
20%) over commercial carriers and private pay patients who paid charges.
(Medicare and Medicaid patients were essentially a captive group). This
discount gave Blue Cross a competitive edge and allowed them to offer a
more expensive policy (a service benefit) and to increase their market
share over the commercial carriers. (Although in recent years, their
7market share has declined from 49.1% in 1950 to 40.3% in 1985.)
The Retrospective Payment System of hospital reimbursement, which 
provided no incentive for efficient and productive operations, had 
become unmanageable. Efforts to contain costs had not been successful. 
The Federal Government, insurance intermediaries, and private pay 
patients were all complaining, and vehemently so, about the high cost of 
health care and especially about the high cost of hospital care. The 
insurance companies had no formal plan on how to attack this dilemma.
But the Federal Government did, and toward the end of 1983 introduced 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM 
The Beginning of Change
As mentioned in chapter one, the Medicare program began by
reimbursing hospitals on a cost-based formula."*" This continued for
seventeen years. The hospitals, using a lengthy and complex cost
report, determined what the Medicare Retrospective Payment System owed
them. The government reimbursed the hospital based on the proportion of
Medicare patients it served. For example, if the hospital incurred
allowable costs of $100 million and 36% of its patient volume were
Medicare patients, then the hospital received $36 million form the
government for the services it provided to these patients. (Although
this formula is somewhat simplified, it is essentially how the Medicare 
1RPS worked.) Overall, the system provided hospitals with an incentive
to expand their services and physical plants and no encouragement to
manage productivity and/or costs. Much of the financial burden for
excessive hospital spending was being assumed by the government. "Even
Section 223, Limitation on Routine Costs, which had been in place since
1973, had only a minimal impact on reducing hospital spending or
encouraging better cost and productivity management."'*'
The effects of the cost-based reimbursement system have 
not been altogether bad. Since 1966, more improvements 
have been made in the United States' national health care 
system and in the health status of the elderly than in 
any other period in American history. The quality and 
size of the physical plant have improved and so have the 
scope and complexity of the services that hospitals offer.
The large infusion of government cash into the health care 
system since 1966 has allowed unprecedented technical 
advances. Over time, however, as the level of hospital
25
spending increased and the size of the aged population 
increased, the government's Medicare expenditures for 
health care also increased at too rapid a rate to 
be affordable. National health expenditures, which 
includes all public and private spending, increased 
from $43 billion in 1965 to $355 billion in 1983. (1)
The Federal Government was noticeably concerned about the high cost
of health care and, as discussed earlier, had established commissions
and panels to study the issue and make recommendations. However, no
viable solutions to the Retrospective Payment System emerged.
Expenditures for health care by Medicare alone increased from $5.6
billion in 1972 to $34.4 billion in 1983 - an increase of 515% in twelve 
2years. See Figure 2-1 below.














1972 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83
Year
Source: "Table 2, Discharges, average length of stay, days of care, 
total charges, and program payments for Medicare hospital 
beneficiaries receiving short-stay hospital inpatient 
services, by Medicare status of the beneficiary: Calendar 
years 1972-1983." Health Care Financing Administration; 
Baltimore, Maryland. Unpublished.
The early 1980s also witnessed a growing concern with respect to 
the national debt and the present and projected budget deficits 
(national defense, health care, etc.). There were those in government
26
who believed that if the rate of increase in government health care
expenditures was not reduced, the Medicare trust fund could have a $300
1billion deficit by 1995. "The government recognized that changes had
to be made, not only in the level of expenditures, but also in the
1incentives indigenous to a cost-based system."
TEFRA
In 1982, Congress passed the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility 
Act (TEFRA). One of the provisions of the act required the Department 
of Health and Human Services to develop a prospective reimbursement
3methodology by the end of that year. This new methodology was to 
replace the retrospective, cost-based, payment system of Medicare 
payments and represented a profound adjustment to the hospital industry. 
The Medicare reimbursement system was being changed. The new system was 
designed to move the payment for hospital services from a system with 
inflationary incentives to a system with incentives for cost control and 
efficiency.
The legislated prescription for slowing the rate of 
increase in Medicare hospital expenditures is economic 
in nature. The industry has not been able to voluntarily 
stem rapidly increasing hospital costs and total expend­
itures. Hospitals have been at the mercy of both demand- 
pull and cost-push inflationary forces, as well as an 
inflationary reimbursement system. Much of the demand 
for hospital services is highly in-elastic, that is, 
insensitive to changes in price. The problem has been 
further compounded by the fact that economic activity 
in the industry is not controlled by the classic forces 
of supply and demand. Hospital services are almost never 
purchased by an informed consumer. It is his agent, the 
physician, who decides which services will be purchased. 
Furthermore, the patient's financial risk is limited to 
the amount of his insurance deductible, which, for most 
hospital services, is minimal. The physician assumes 
no financial responsibility for the patient's consump­
tion of hospital services. The reimbursement system 
assumes financial responsibility for the hospital
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services consumed, and has had little, if any, input
into the decision of which resources will be purchased. (3)
At the same time that Congress passed TEFRA, it recognized that the 
transition from a retrospective payment system to a prospective one 
would be difficult for many, if not most, hospitals. Therefore, it also 
provided for paid incentives or penalties to hospitals if Medicare costs 
were less than, or in excess of, predetermined target rates of increase 
per admission during the transitional period.
With the TEFRA mandate, the Department of Health and Human Services 
predetermined fixed prices that were set prospectively for Medicare 
inpatient hospital services. The financial burden associated with poor 
labor productivity, excessive spending, or ineffective cost control was 
now on the hospital and the government would no longer be at risk for 
the spending levels of these institutions.
It is interesting to note that numerous authors who have written on 
the Medicare Prospective Payment System have all recognized that it is 
the physician, functioning as the patient's agent, who actually controls 
utilization levels of hospital services and, therefore, a significant 
level of hospital expenditures. However, Congress, with the enactment 
of TEFRA, placed the onus of controlling expenditures on the individual 
hospitals, thus requiring hospital administrators to hammer out the 
details of reducing costs with their medical staffs (most, if not all, 
of whom want the best and latest, not to mention expensive, technology) 
and thereby avoided attacking physicians directly for their 
over-utilization of the system.
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DIAGNOSTIC RELATED GROUPS (DRGs)
The Medicare Prospective Payment System was built around a concept
known as Diagnostic Related Groups or DRGs. Diagnostic Related Groups
were initially developed by a team of Yale researchers, clinical
consultants, and physicians under a grant from the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA), a division of the Department of Health and Human
Services. DRGs are a patient classification system based on patient
attributes and treatment processes rather than on bed size, service
1capacity, or occupancy rate of a hospital or its medical staff.
DRGs transform a hospital from an entity perceived as a 
conglomeration of tests, rooms, and services to an entity 
that provides very special products. Those products, or 
DRGs, are treatments of heart attacks, broken bones, ulcers, 
respiratory problems and so on. Each of these hospital 
products and patient treatments has an assumed volume of 
resource utilization associated with it. Average resource 
use is assumed to be a function of the patient's age, sex, 
primary and secondary diagnosis, and discharge status. (1)
The researchers at Yale had developed a statistical method of
grouping patients by diagnosis and utilization of hospital resources as 
4early as 1975. Initially, they defined 383 categories (DRGs) that were
expanded to 467 in 1983 and to 473 by 1988. The concept of DRGs is
built around the theory that patient treatments can be grouped into
various product categories and comparing them with "statistically valid
national averages, one can determine, within reasonable parameters,
whether the resources used during a particular patient's stay were
appropriate for that patient's specific condition."1 Hundreds of
thousands of cases were studied, analyzed, and grouped by the
researchers in order to provide a basis for identifying and measuring
DRGs in utilization review - which was the original purpose for their 
5development. The grouping criteria used in establishing the original
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DRGs was redefined and reclassified numerous times with the aid of
computer programs in order to group and classify patients with similar
characteristics and minimize disparities and variances with groups.
DRGs are defined by several characteristics. In addition 
to age and sex, the multiple diagnoses and procedures that 
a patient receives are translated in a hospital's medical 
records department into what are known as ICD-9-CM (Inter­
national Classification of Diseases, 9th ed. Clinical 
Modifications) codes. There are over 12,000 numbered 
ICD-9-CM codes that correspond to the above characteristics.
In addition, to determine DRG classification, the primary 
diagnosis of a patient is initially classified into one of 
23 major diagnostic categories (MDCs). Clinically speaking, 
the human body is perceived as a system of 23 interlocking 
systems or MDCs, for example, the circulatory system, the 
nervous system, the muscular system, the skeletal system, 
etc. The MDC and ICD-9-CM codes ultimately define the DRG, 
which is most descriptive of the product the patient received 
from the hospital. (1)
Thus, diseases that tend to be diagnosed and treated in similar
ways by similar specialists are aggregated in the same MDC regardless of
etiology and each hospital discharge is assigned to one (and only one)
0
MDC based on the patient's principal diagnosis code.
With few exceptions, each MDC is then divided depending on whether 
or not the patient requires a procedure performed in the operating room. 
Discharges are referred to as surgical hospitalizations provided they 
have had an operating room procedure while those that require no 
operating room procedure are referred to as medical hospitalizations. 
Medical hospitalizations can then be assigned to clinically coherent 
groups of principal diagnoses and surgical hospitalizations into groups 
of operating room procedures referred to as procedure categories. These 
procedure categories are based on the intensity of resource consumption 
and are hierarchical in nature. In other words, a discharge who has 
multiple operating room procedures is assigned to the surgical group 
based on the most resource intensive procedure within the hierarchy.
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Depending on the MDC, diagnostic groups (corresponding 
to medical hospitalizations) and procedure categories 
(corresponding to surgical hospitalizations) may be 
further partitioned on the basis of age, the existence of 
comorbidities and complications, and in a few cases, 
discharge status. Some procedure categories are also 
partitioned on the basis of principal diagnosis. A com­
pound variable, age 70cc, is used extensively throughout 
this system. This is a dichotomous (2 level) variable that 
takes on the value "yes" if age>=70 and/or there are sub­
stantial comorbidities or complications, but takes on the 
value "no" otherwise. Substantial complications and co­
morbidities are defined as those conditions that, in the 
judgement of the clinicians constructing the system, 
would be likely to increase the length of stay for 75 
percent of the patients by at least one day.
As an example of how each MDC is partitioned into DRGs, 
consider MDC 13: Diseases and Disorders of the Female 
Reproductive System. The classification of discharges into 
DRGs or case types within this MDC is summarized in the 
tree diagram presented in Figure 2-2 on page 31. Geometric 
symbols (diamond, circle, hexagon), represent decision 
points in the division process and contain the variable 
used in the decision. Lines emanate from the symbol 
indicating how the groups were split on the basis of 
that variable. Final groups or DRGs are represented by 
squares. Inside each square is the sequential DRG 
number.
Medical hospitalizations in MDC 13 are divided into 
three diagnostic groups corresponding to diagnoses of 
malignancy, infection, and menstrual and other diag­
noses. Discharges with a malignancy diagnosis are 
further partitioned on whether or not age is greater 
than or equal to 70 years and/or there are substantial 
comorbidities or complications. Thus, medical hospital­
izations, with a principal diagnosis pertaining to 
diseases and disorders of the female reproductive system, 
are divided into four case types or DRGs.
Surgical hospitalizations in MDC 13 are divided into 
eight procedure categories: (1) pelvic evisceration, 
radical hysterectomy, and vulvectomy, (2) other hyster­
ectomy, (3) reconstructive procedures, (4) uterus and 
adnexa procedure, (5) vagina, cervix and vulva procedures, 
(6) laparoscopy and endoscopy, (7) D&C, conization, and 
radio-implant, (8) other OR [Operating Room] procedures.
The surgical hierarchy of these categories follows in 
the same order. Within this hierarchy, for example, a 
discharge with both D&C and a hysterectomy would be 
assigned to the hysterectomy category. As indicated 
in the diagram, four of these categories are further 
partitioned on the basis of age and/or the presence of 
substantial comorbidities or complications, principal 
diagnosis of malignancy, and tubal interruption.
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diagnosis pertaining to diseases and disorders of the 
female reproductive system are divided into thirteen 
case types or DRGs. (6)
DRGs and Prospective Payment
Yale's completion of the DRG system was concurrent with the federal 
government's realization that its retrospective, cost-based payment 
system had to be changed to a prospective system. Although DRGs, as 
mentioned earlier, were originally developed to facilitate utilization 
review, it appeared that they could also be used for a prospective 
payment system. However, this required placing a financial value on 
each DRG.
To do this, the costs of providing care to hundreds of thousands of
cases across the country were studied and analyzed. Each patient's
individual hospitalization bill was compared to the cost report for that
particular hospital. The government was then able to determine an
estimated cost for each particular case. Thus, the average per-case
cost of thousands of cases with each DRG classification was able to be
determined. Furthermore, the average cost per case for all cases
studied was also determined. The government was then able to design a
weighting index for each DRG by comparing the average costs of all DRGs.
For example, if the average cost of all DRGs is $4,000, it is assigned
the weighting index of 1.0 If the average cost for DRG 78 is $4,400, it
is assigned the index of 1.1 ($4,400 divided by $4,000). Likewise, if
the average cost of DRG 196 is $2,718, it is assigned the index of 0.68
($2718 divided by $4,000). In this example, the weighting index
indicates that, on the average, DRG 78 uses 10% more resources than the
1 7average DRG and DRG 196 uses only 0.68%. ' '
This weighting mechanism was then used to determine a
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numerical value to measure the relative complexity of 
cases treated by any particular hospital. A hospital's 
costs are assumed to be a function of two elements: (1) 
the cost of its individual resources and (2) the com­
plexity of the cases that the hospital treats. The com­
plexity of a hospital could now be measured by a case-mix 
index, which is the sum of the weighting factors assigned 
to the DRGs treated at that particular hospital. To be 
equitable in any reimbursement scheme involving average 
costs, hospitals should be given credit for the relative 
complexity of the cases that are treated there compared 
to other hospitals. Ultimately, the reimbursement is based 
on two primary factors: (1) average costs and (2) relative 
complexity. At this juncture, it is important to recog­
nize that hospital management faces two challenges: first, 
to effectively utilize hospital resources (contain costs) 
and second, to define the complexity of each case accurately, 
since the accuracy of that definition translates directly 
into a specific payment. (1)
Adapting to a Prospective Payment System
As a starting point, the PPS was to include the Medicare costs
associated with an inpatient hospital stay which included bed, board,
nursing, ancillary services, malpractice insurance costs, etc. The
complexity of hospitals' cost structures made it too cumbersome for a
comprehensive prospective payment system to be effective in a short
period of time. Therefore, only inpatient services were covered. Those
costs that continued to be paid under the retrospective payment system
included services to out-patients, capital costs, medical education in
8 9teaching hospitals, and Medicare bad debt. '
Congress1 ultimate goal is to include all costs in the Prospective
1Payment System. This was to have been accomplished by October 1, 1986 
but there continues to be a heated debate over this issue between the 
hospitals, through the American Hospital Association, and Congress over 
the methodology. Capital costs, because they vary widely from hospital 
to hospital due to different debt structure, range and complexity of
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services offered, and the age of the plant and equipment, are the most 
difficult of the costs to pay on a prospective basis.1
However, through the PPS, the government has had greater control 
over health care expenditures and can more accurately predict what its 
expenditures will be in any fiscal year. Prior to PPS, these 
expenditures were difficult at best to project because they were a 
"function of hospital spending, and the level of spending was not known 
until after the fact, whereas the level of spending can now be defined 
before the fact."1
Hospital Negotiated Changes
Obviously, hospitals were concerned about such an abrupt change in
the Medicare reimbursement system and successfully lobbied Congress for
some changes in the original PPS structure.
Hospitals wanted recognition of different and unique 
cost structures and the difficulty of adjusting to 
payments based on national averages within a very short 
period of time. Their ability to be cost effective with 
respect to those payment levels had a significant 
impact on the short-term viability of some of those 
hospitals. In addition, recognition had to be given 
to the variance in costs and treatment patterns 
across the nation. Typically, hospitals in the 
Northeast and Midwest were more costly than those 
in the West and Southwest. As an example, average 
cost per discharge in Region 9 (West Coast) was 
$2918, but the average cost per discharge in Region 
5 (Alabama, Kentucky, Missouri, and Tennessee) was 
$2,450. (1)
Congress acknowledged these problems with a phasing-in mechanism 
which addressed the fact that regional, as well as urban and rural, 
average costs were different from national average costs and that 
individual hospital costs were different within each region. (See 
Figure 2-3 and Table 2-1 on page 35). Thus, hospitals were able to move
FIGURE 2-3 -- PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM'S REGIONAL DIVISIONS
4
Source: Hospital Statistic's. American Hospital Association, 
Chicago, 111., 1988. 1 = New England; 2 = Middle
Atlantic; 3 = South Atlantic; 4 = East North Central; 
5 = East South Central; 6 = West North Central;
7 = West South Central; 8 = Mountain; 9 = Pacific.
TABLE 2-1 —  REGIONAL DIAGNOSTIC RELATED GROUP RATES, BOTH URBAN and RURAL
EFFECTIVE OCTOBER 1,1983
Urban Rural
New England  
Middle Atlantic  
South Atlantic 
East North C entra l 
East South C entral 
West North C entral 





















Source: Rusynko, Barbara, "DRGs, Who, What, How, Where," Today1s 
OR Nurse. April 6, 1984, vol. 4.
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gradually from a system based on individual hospital costs to a system
based on national averages. The hospital could use its own base-year
costs as a starting point and carry that figure forward, adjusting for
inflation, into each of the first four prospective payment years. (1981
costs were designated as the base-year). Throughout the four year
phase-in period, the proportion of the DRG payment that was based on
specific hospital costs would gradually decrease, and the proportion of
the DRG payment that was based on national averages would gradually 
1 3 10increase. ' ' (See Table 2-2 below).
TABLE 2-2 —  PHASE-IN SCHEDULE OF DRG PAYMENTS 
BASED ON NATIONAL AVERAGES
Hospital Regional National
Year Specific % Specific % Average %
1 75 25 0
2 50 37.5 12.5
3 25 37.5 37.5
4 0 0 100
Source: Morgan, Lloyd B. and Koppel, Craig A., "An 
Overview of DRG Regulations - the impact of 
changing reimbursement patterns," Topics in Health 
Care Financing. Spring, 1985.
This phasing-in mechanism provided hospitals with time to adjust
their cost structures and included a means for dealing with regional
cost differences.
Hospitals also won recognition of unusual cases involving
comorbidity and complications, as was discussed earlier. These cases
Iwere termed "outliers" and required payment above and beyond the DRG 
payment. In order to receive additional payments due to comorbidity 
and/or complications, the excess days in the patient's length of stay or
37
unusually high costs had to be reviewed and certified as medically 
necessary.
Exclusions
A number of specific hospitals were (and still are) excluded from 
the PPS because their cost structure is much less predictable than a 
primary acute care hospital and they do not fit easily into a DRG system 
which relies heavily on averages and gives little consideration to 
unusual situations. These include rehabilitation hospitals, veteran's 
hospitals, children's hospitals, psychiatric hospitals (scheduled to 
begin PPS in 1990),^ and long-term care facilities. Separate 
rehabilitation and psychiatric units within regular acute care hospitals 
were also excluded. However, Congress hopes to include them under the 
umbrella of PPS in the not too distant future.^ ^
Oversight of the PPS
Congress also provided for the oversight of the Prospective Payment 
System through a fifteen member commission, appointed by the Office of 
Technology Assessment (OTA), to determine rate increase factors applied 
to hospital payments on a year-to-year basis and to review the 
recalibration of DRGs as practice patterns changed and responded to the 
incentive to minimize the resources necessary to treat any particular 
patient effectively. In addition to providing oversight to the PPS, 
this commission was authorized to perform a utilization review of 
hospital admitting patterns so that a patient who would have ordinarily 
been treated with one hospital stay and one payment was not suddenly 
treated with two hospital stays and two payments. Congress, however,
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was not bound by any rate or DRG recalibration recommendations made by
1 3  6 this committee. ' '
The Impact of the Prospective Payment System
Prior to PPS, revenues were the main focus of hospital financial
management. Revenues continued to be a focus of hospital financial
management after the implementation of PPS, however, the main focus
shifted to an effective, productive, and efficient use of resources.
Hospitals also began a new era of cooperation with their medical staffs
as physician practice patterns were reviewed in order to treat patients
with the fewest resources that could be effective without reducing the
quality of care. Hospitals even began to scrutinize services that were
unprofitable and in many cases discontinued those services that were not 
12cost effective.
Marketing became a major activity around hospitals as decreasing 
occupancies caused institutions to actively compete for patients - an 
activity almost unheard of before. Hospitals began to aggressively 
market themselves in order to protect and increase their market share of 
patients. Ambulatory services, which are still cost-based reimbursed,
were (and still are) aggressively marketed in an effort to increase
1 12 volume. '
Initially, there was considerable concern that hospitals would make 
major cost-shifting adjustments - adjust charges so that the commercial 
insurance companies and private-pay patients would make up the loss in 
revenue caused by PPS. Price cutting, however, is what has actually 
happened in almost every industry that has been deregulated and where 
supply exceeded demand. It also happened in the hospital industry as
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both a positional technique and a survival mechanism in the
1 12 marketplace. '
Hospitals that had lower costs than the national average received 
additional revenues beyond what they would have received under the 
retrospective payment system. These were generally small community 
hospitals, which by their very nature do not have a cost structure as 
high as many of the larger and more complex hospitals.'*' Those hospitals 
with costs higher than the national average, due, at least in part, 
because of consumer demand for medical specialists and/or high 
technology, either found ways to reduce their costs or actively pursued
affiliations, consolidations, or mergers with other institutions to gain
12 1 12 economies of scale. Some hospitals actually ceased to exist. '
PPS forces hospitals and physicians to maintain the present quality 
of care but to maintain it at a lower cost. This requires the 
appropriateness of any test to be carefully evaluated by physicians. 
Unless new technology can be cost justified, hospitals are unwilling to 
purchase it. Whether or not this will reduce the demand for 
technological innovation or reduce the rate at which research and 
development dollars are invested toward technological developments
4- u  1 3remains to be seen.
Has The PPS Saved Medicare Hospitalization Dollars?
As has already been discussed, the purpose of the Medicare 
Prospective Payment System was to decrease the rapid increase of 
Medicare hospitalization expenditures. The government wanted hospitals 
to contain costs through increases in productivity, and cost effective 
as well as efficient treatments and procedures. The government did not
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stipulate how the hospitals were to obtain increases in productivity, 
cost effectiveness, and efficiency; however, through DRG reimbursement, 
it was exceedingly clear they they intended to reduce the rate of 
inpatient hospitalization costs for Medicare patients. The question is: 
did they?
Consider Figure 2-4 on page 41. It demonstrates graphically 
Medicare's hospitalization expenditures from 1972 thru 1988.
This graph repeats the earlier demonstration of years 1972 thru 
1983. For years 1984 thru 1988, the continuation of the black line
2represents Medicare's actual payments for inpatient hospital services.
The red dotted line indicates anticipated Medicare expenditures had the
Retrospective Payment System remained in effect. The anticipated
14expenditures are based on Linear Regression using the four years prior 
to each determined year in order to estimate what each determined year's 
expenditures would have been.
After the implementation of PPS, Medicare's hospitalization 
expenditures in 1984 were $38.5 billion and increased to $46.9 billion 
in 1988. Had the Retrospective Payment System remained in effect, it is 
estimated that the 1984 hospitalization expenditure would have been 
$39,2 billion increasing to $56.5 billion in 1988. Adding the 
difference between the estimated and the actual expenditures for the 
first five years of the PPS, suggests that Medicare has saved 
approximately $27.6 billion.
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Year
Source: "Table 2, Discharges, average length of stay, days of
care, total charges, and program payments for Medicare 
hospital beneficiaries receiving short-stay hospital 
inpatient services, by Medicare status of the beneficiary: 
Calendar years 1972-1983." Health Care Financing 
Administration; Baltimore, Maryland. Unpublished.
Table 2-3 below, lists Medicare's actual hospitalization 
expenditures from 1972 thru 1988. It also lists the amount of 
additional dollars spent over the prior year and the percentage of 
increase from the prior year.
TABLE 2-3 — MEDICARE HOSPITALIZATION EXPENDITURES, INCREASED 
YEARLY EXPENSE, and YEARLY PERCENTAGE OF INCREASE
Increase over 
Expenditure Prior Year
Year (in billions) (in billions) % of Increase
1972 $ 5,576
1973 6,446 $ 870 15.7%




Year (in billions) (in billions) % of Increase
1975 9,748 1,911 24.4
1976 11,803 2,055 21.1
1977 13,944 2,141 18.1
1978 16,008 2,064 14.8
1979 18,463 2,455 15.3
1980 22,099 3,636 19.7
1981 25,936 3,837 17.4
1982 30,601 4,665 18.0
1983 34,338 3,737 12.2
1984 38,500 4,162 12.1
1985 40,200 1,700 4.4
1986 41,781 1,581 3.9
1987 44,068 2,287 5.5
1988 46,879 2,811 6.4
This table rather dramatically demonstrates that after the 
implementation of the Prospective Payment System in October, 1983, the 
rate of increase for Medicare hospitalization expenditures decreased. 
Under the Retrospective Payment System, the yearly percentage of 
increase varies from 12.2% to 24.4%. 1983 was the final year that 
Medicare reimbursed hospitals under the Retrospective Payment System and 
it had the lowest percentage of increase while this system was in effect 
- 12.2%. Undoubtedly, hospitals spent this year implementing cost 
containment measures in preparation for the PPS. In 1984, the first 
full year of the PPS, the percentage of increase was 12.1%. However, 
during this first year, hospitals were reimbursed at 75% of costs and 
25% of regional average costs and, therefore, were not drastically 
affected by the PPS. The remaining years of the Prospective Payment 
System, 1985 thru 1988, saw increase ranging from 4.4% to 6.4%. It is 
indeed obvious that the Prospective Payment System caused a decline in 
the yearly increase of Medicare’s hospitalization expenditures.
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Having reviewed the evolution of the Retrospective Payment System 
and its cost-based reimbursement policy, the implementation of the 
Prospective Payment System, and establishing that the PPS lowered 
Medicare's increasing rate of hospitalization expenditures, it is now 
time to determine what changes, if any, the Prospective Payment System 
has had on hospital productivity. The next chapter establishes a 
productivity framework - defining what productivity is, what is going to 
be measured, how it is measured, and explaining how the different 
components are involved in hospital productivity.
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CHAPTER THREE: DEVELOPING A HOSPITAL PRODUCTIVITY FRAMEWORK 
Defining the Product
Hospital productivity has been an elusive measure. This
elusiveness is because the hospital industry, the insurance
intermediaries, and the government could not simultaneously agree on how
to define what the hospital's product was. However, with the
implementation of the Prospective Payment System, there is greater
impetus to accept the discharged patient as the hospital's product. In
fact, both the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) and the
Prospective Payment Commission (ProPAC) have begun to formulate hospital
1 2producitvity using the discharge as the final product. ' Use of the
patient discharge as the final product is also the subject of two soon
3 4to be published papers on hospital productivity. '
Texts on Economics define productivity as output per worker hour,^ 
where per unit labor cost is mathematically expressed by:
W x L = W
Q “ Q/l
where W equals the wage rate, L equals worker hours, and Q equals
output. Thus, for a given wage rate, increases in output per worker
directly lowers unit labor costs. Additionally, capital productivity is
defined as the value of goods and services in constant dollars produced
0per unit of capital services. There is also multifactor productivity. 
It is the value of goods and services in constant prices produced per 
combined unit of capital and labor inputs. It is the output per worker
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hour, however, that this paper is concerned with. But what is the 
hospital's output? What is it that the hospital produces?
When we look at a car manufacturing plant we know that it produces
cars and its output is measured in the numbers and quality of cars it
produces. When we view a paper mill we know that it produces paper and
its output is measured in tons of paper produced. "Hospital production,
[however], is not the same as production in a factory where there are
clear standards and criteria pertaining to the utilization of materials,
labor, and equipment. In manufacturing, design quality, and
performances are subject to continual monitoring, measurement, feedback,
3and adaptation of the process of production." Nonetheless, hospitals 
do use raw materials in the form of labor, supplies, and equipment to 
produce a product. It is defining the hospital's product that has been 
the center of many debates.
Hospitals have been reluctant to view a discharged patient as their 
finished product. This is due, at least in part, to the fact that not 
all discharges are "successful outcomes." Some patients, due to their 
individual circumstances, are not thought to be whole upon discharge. 
There are those who are involved in motor vehicle accidents and leave 
the hospital permanently dismembered or handicapped. And, of course, 
there are those patients who die. The community and the hospital 
industry prefer to view hospitals as institutions where people go to 
have medical problems alleviated and resolved and from which people 
emerge as healthy, productive members of society. For the most part, 
this is true - but not always. Therefore, individual hospitals used 
varying activities to measure specific products.
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The activities of distinct departments were often used to 
demonstrate how busy or how productive the hospital was. The number of 
tests run by the laboratory, the number of therapeutic procedures 
performed by physical therapy, the number of births, the number of 
surgeries, the number of admissions, etc., are all examples of 
statistics maintained by hospitals to indicate how active they are. In 
fact, the American Hospital Association publishes each year a survey 
called Hospital Statistics that has more than 200 pages of the different 
statistics monitored by the hospital industry (see Table 3-1 on pages 
49-50 for a sample of the data available in these volumes).
With the advent of the Prospective Payment System and the use of
Diagnostic Related Groups, there has been greater emphasis on viewing
the hospital's discharges as its product. This is the reason hospitals
receive payment. It also defines the main business of the institution:
"...to accept, one at a time, human beings who have a problem, a
disease, or a disorder, and to evaluate and treat, through physicians
and other professionals, the problem and the patient. Under the
direction of these professionals, the institution provides a set of
goods and services deemed appropriate to the diagnosis and treatment of
the illness. It is this bundle of things that we define as the product
3of the hospital." To focus simply on the intermediate product is to 
miss the point of the enterprise: to treat patients who have illnesses.
These "bundles of things" have been the conversion of labor, 
supplies, and equipment into standard outputs such as clean linens, 
meals, medications, laboratory procedures, surgical procedures, etc., 
that hospitals have so often used to indicate how active they were.
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3caring for patients, they are really intermediary products."
The labor, supplies, and equipment used in a hospital are similar
to the bill of materials for a car in the manufacturing environment --
metal, engine, tires, glass, upholstery, screws, etc. Obviously, there
are differences between a car factory and a health care institution.
But Theodore Levitt has pointed out the importance of the analogy:
So many things go wrong because companies fail to 
adequately define what they sell. Companies in so 
called service industries generally think of them­
selves as offering services rather than manufacturing 
products; hence they fail to think and act as compre­
hensively as do manufacturing companies concerned with 
the efficient, low cost production of customer satis­
fying products. (7)
Additionally, it is after discharge from the hospital that the
patient1s chart is coded by Medical Records Departments with the
Diagnostic Related Group that defines the services provided by the
hospital and reimbursement for those services. Furthermore, it is the
statistic used by government and insurance intermediaries as a basis for
the determination of other health statistics such as length of stay,
cost per discharge, differentiation of patient's diagnoses, and many 
8 9others. ' Finally, the literature on the Prospective Payment System
and Diagnostic Related Groups is replete with the use of, or the implied
use of, "discharge" to describe the hospital's product.^
It, therefore, appears to be reasonable and accurate to define the
hospital product as a discharge and to use the American Hospital
Association and government definition of a discharge to be:
...the formal release of a patient by a hospital; that 
is, the termination of a period of hospitalization by 
death or disposition to place of residence, nursing 
home or another hospital. (8) (11)
For purposes of clarity, and to maintain an understanding of terms, 
a hospital is defined as:
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Short-stay special and general hospitals have six or 
more beds for inpatient use and an average length of 
stay of less than 30 days. Federal hospitals and 
hospital units of institutions are not included. (8) (11)
Federal hospitals and hospital units of institutions are excluded 
because they
2do not fall within the Prospective Payment System. A patient is 
defined as:
A person who is formally admitted to the inpatient 
services of a short-stay hospital for observation, 
care, diagnosis, or treatment. [The] number of 
patients refers to the number of discharges during 
the year, including any multiple discharges of the 
same individual from one short-stay hospital or more.
Infants admitted on the day of birth, directly or by 
transfer from another medical facility, with or 
without mention of disease, disorder, or immaturity 
are included. All newborn infants, defined as those 
admitted by birth to the hospital are excluded. (8)
Average length of stay is a term frequently used in the hospital 
industry and
is defined as:
...the total number of patient days accumulated at the
time of discharge by patients discharged during the
year divided by the number of patients discharged. (8) (11)
These terms are used extensively in the literature on the hospital 
industry, by government, the insurance intermediaries, and by the 
American Hospital Association. This paper will use these terms as 
defined unless otherwise stated.
The Worker
Having defined the output, or product, part of the definition of 
productivity, it is necessary to define who and what the worker is 
(productivity being the output per worker hour). Hospitals employ a 
number of skilled and not so skilled laborers. These include 
administrators, registered nurses (RN), licensed practical nurses (LPN),
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various technicians and therapists, maintenance personnel, housekeepers, 
dieticians, secretaries, etc. All of these personnel are utilized to 
keep the hospital functioning and in the production of its product - the 
patient discharge. Most hospital employees are employed to provide 
direct patient care. However, a significant number of them, such as 
administrators, secretaries, and maintenance personnel, do not have 
direct patient care responsibilities.
In addition to their employment title, ie: RN, LPN, etc., hospital 
employees are classified by full and part-time equivalents. A full-time 
equivalent (FTE) is defined as an employee who works 2,080 hours in a 
year. The figure 2,080 is determined as follows:
40 hours per week x 52 weeks per year = 2,080 hours per year 
Therefore, each full-time employee is one who works 40 hours per week 
for 52 weeks and is considered to be one full-time equivalent (1 FTE).
Part-time employees are those laborers who work less than 40 hours 
per week and are represented by a fraction of full-time equivalency.
For example, if an employee works only one day per week (8 hours), the 
he/she represent 0.2 of a full-time equivalent (one-fifth of the work 
week or 8 hours divided by 40 hours).
Thus, adding full-time and part-time equivalents will provide the
hospital industry's full-time equivalency. Which, when multiplied by
2,080 hours per FTE will produce the number of hours worked each year in
the hospital industry. This, however, presents a rather large figure to
work with. For example, in 1983 there 3,102,000 FTEs in non-federal
11short-stay general and other special hospitals. This represents 
6,452,160,000 worker hours - a rather formidable figure. It has become 
the standard of the industry to use FTEs as a measure of worker hours.
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Furthermore, both the American Hospital Association and the Health
Financial Management Association publish their data using FTEs4 as does
13the United States Department of Labor.
There are, however, two weaknesses in the FTE data used to
represent hospital labor inputs. First, the data do not reflect the use
of contractual labor which causes an underestimation of actual FTEs and
4overstates productivity. Second, only the number of FTEs employed on 
the last day of the year is reported. "While this measure may not 
accurately represent the labor hours used throughout the year, it is
4believed to be adequate for productivity trend analysis."
The Annual Survey published each year by the American Hospital
Association in Hospital Statistics is the source of information and data
regarding FTEs for the government, insurance intermediaries, and the
hospital industry.1,2,4/9/11,13 To maintain consistency, it is the
AHA's definition of personnel (labor) that will be used:
Number of persons on the hospital payroll as of September
30, 19_. Personnel are recorded in Hospital Statistics
as full-time equivalents(FTEs), which are calculated 
by adding the number of full-time personnel to one- 
half the number of part-time personnel, excluding 
medical residents, interns, and other trainees. (11)
Thus, any errors in reporting FTEs (ie: contractual labor) will remain
consistent over time and should not cause significant over or under
misrepresentation of hospital productivity.
Productivity
As defined earlier, productivity is the output per worker hour.
The output of non-federal short-stay general and special hospitals has 
been defined as the discharge from the hospital. The worker hour, due 
to the current reporting mechanisms utilized in the hospital industry,
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has been defined by the equivalent terra: full-time equivalent.
Therefore, the determination of productivity, for each respective year, 
is the result of dividing the output (discharges) by the worker hour 
(FTE). Proceeding in this manner, hospital productivity during the 
retrospective payment system and since the implementation of the 
Prospective Payment System can be determined. This methodology will 
then indicate what effect (if any) the PPS, assuming all other factors 
constant, has had on the productivity of non-federal short-stay general 
and special hospitals.
Efficiency
Gains or losses in productivity are frequently associated with
gains or losses in economic efficiency - the least cost method of
14producing a product. However, an industry can become so cognizant of 
its productivity levels that it may overlook other less costly methods 
of producing its product such as the cost of capital, supplies, 
equipment, etc.
The Prospective Payment System, as discussed in chapter 2, was 
designed and implemented with the hope that hospitals would increase 
productivity, efficiency, and effectiveness. Under the retrospective 
payment system, there was little, if any, incentive to use less costly 
supplies, medications, or equipment in treating illness because, for all 
practical purposes, whatever the hospital spent was reimbursed. The PPS 
required hospitals, if they wished to survive in the marketplace, to 
also improve how efficiently they were providing treatment for diseases 
and disorders. Because productivity and efficiency were expected
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by-products of the PPS and are often used simultaneously, it appears to 
be necessary to include a measure of efficiency in this analysis.
A hospital's total expenses divided by its number of discharges 
will provide the institution's cost per discharge. In view of the fact 
that expenses for capital and medical education for teaching hospitals 
are treated identically under both reimbursement schemes, there was no 
incentive for hospitals to make adjustments in these major expenses. It 
seems logical and reasonable, then, to assume that decreases, or 
increases, in the rate of cost per discharge will provide a measure of 
the hospital industry's efficiency. Comparing the rate of change prior 
to and since the implementation of the PPS will indicate whether or not 
hospitals have been able to find ways of utilizing supplies, equipment, 
and personnel more efficiently. Combined with the information on 
productivity, these two measures should provide valuable data on the 
hospital industry's ability to contain costs under the PPS.
Effectiveness
It does little good for hospitals to improve productivity and/or 
efficiency if the industry does not maintain or improve effectiveness - 
producing the desired or expected result. It is important to not only 
produce the intermediate products (lab test, meals, etc.) but also the 
final product (the discharge) efficiently. If, however, the 
intermediate products are not used effectively or are ordered 
inappropriately in the production of the final product, it is a waste of 
resources no matter how efficiently it is produced.
The effectiveness of the hospital industry is a quality of care 
issue.^ While the effect of the PPS on quality of care is uncertain
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(how can it be measured?), no systematic study has suggested that the 
quality of care, thus the effectiveness of the hospital industry has 
declined.1,2*3,15,16 „In fact, if hospitals were to respond 
rationally to the financial incentives [of PPS], one would expect them 
to implement programs to reduce those aspects of hospital care that 
increase the cost of hospitalization, such as iatrogenesis [disease 
induced by a physician's words or actions], nosocomial infections
3[infected while in the hospital], readmissions, and the like." The 
risk that the quality of care may suffer still remains. However, it is 
subject to constant monitoring by the Professional Review Organizations 
(PROs) that each hospital must contract with in order to receive 
Medicare payments.
Perhaps the largest concern regarding quality of care 
(effectiveness) was the potential for hospitals to treat one disease or 
disorder at a time for patients with multiple problems. The discharged 
patient would then be readmitted under a different DRG for treatment of 
each illness thus producing multiple bills. The Health Care Financing 
Administration identified this as a potential effect of the PPS in its
31983 annual report. Hospitals have traditionally treated all of the
patient's conditions in a single admission whenever possible. The
potential abuse of the PPS by readmitting the patient for each
concurrent malady was recognized early on. However, while higher rates
of admissions were predicted, they were never experienced. Rather, the
rate of admissions actually decreased in each of the first three years
of PPS for all age groups with the largest decrease in the 65-75 age 
3,15,16category.
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Given the above recent data, it does not appear to be necessary to 
redetermine the hospital industry's effectiveness.
Aggregate and Regional Data
As used in the paper, the term "aggregate" is defined as the 50 
states of the United States and the District of Columbia. The term 
"regional" is defined as the nine areas of the U.S. as described by the 
Bureau of the Census:











Region 3: South Atlantic 

















































Data on the U.S. Associated Areas including American Samoa, Guam, 
the Marshall Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands is not 
included.
Having defined the variables and how they are measured, the actual 
productivity and efficiency measurements are presented in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER FOUR: MEASURING HOSPITAL PRODUCTIVITY 1965 THROUGH 1988 
Introduction
Almost every industry is interested in maintaining an efficient 
balance between material and personnel in order to maintain as high a 
level of productivity as possible. (A possible exception here may be 
government where efficiency and productivity are often talked about but 
gross examples of neither are often reported). For-profit industries 
desire high levels of productivity in order to keep costs at a minimum. 
This allows them to pay high dividends which retains their current 
stockholders and attracts new investors. Non-profit industries also 
desire a high level of productivity so that their bottom line can be 
written in black instead of red ink. Profits earned are returned to the 
organization so that it may up-date technology, expand operations, make 
major improvements, etc. For either industry, profit or non-profit, 
continually operating in the red means extreme vulnerability and 
eventually disaster.
As stated earlier, under the retrospective payment system, 
hospitals had little, if any, incentive to be efficient or productive 
because they were reimbursed whatever it cost them to maintain 
operations. For example, if it cost a hospital $100 million to operate 
in a given year and its patient mix was 60% Blue Cross, 15% Medicare,
15% Medicaid, and 10% other insurance carriers and cash paying patients, 
then Blue Cross reimbursed the hospital $60 million, Medicare reimbursed 
$15 million, Medicaid reimbursed $15 million, and the other insurance 
carriers as well as the cash paying patients paid stated charges - which
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would be in excess of $10 million. Capital expenditures such as major 
equipment purchases, building renovation, plant expansion, etc., were 
virtually "walk-throughs" that Blue Cross, Medicare, and Medicaid paid 
for over a given time period depending on the expense involved. Thus, 
productivity was not an issue that hospitals were concerned about.
With the development of Diagnostic Related Groups (DRGs), the
Prospective Payment System (PPS) began reimbursing hospitals a fixed
dollar amount for each diagnosis treated. Suddenly, hospitals found
themselves thrust into the arena where costs, efficiency, and
productivity were paramount issues. These two major patient groups,
Medicare and Medicaid, represented a significant amount of most
hospitals' income. (Blue Cross followed Medicare and Medicaid with DRG
reimbursement in 1989). Hospitals were now faced with a challenge --
exercise cost containment, become efficient, and learn how to be
productive or go out of business. (Many hospitals did go out of
business as the number of hospitals decreased from a high of 5,979 in
1975 to 5,579 in 1988. In 1984, the first full year of DRG
reimbursement, there were 5,814 short-term general and special care 
1hospitals).
Discussion
Short-term general and special care hospitals began to take a 
serious look at their operations. They have begun to face the challenge 
of the future and, like any rational industry or individual faced with a 
potentially serious reduction in income, they began to search for ways 
that would maximize the return on their investment.
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First on the agenda was to curtail non-acute admissions. The 
Prospective Payment System would not reimburse hospitals for patients 
who were admitted with a disorder or an illness that could be treated in 
a non-acute setting such as a physician's office or a clinic. Table 4-1 
demonstrates how hospital admissions, which in turn become hospital 
discharges, declined as hospitals adjusted to comply with the new 
criteria.
TABLE 4-1 —  U.S. HOSPITAL ADMISSIONS 1965 THRU 1988
Year Admissions 
(in 000's)
% Change Year Admissions 
(in 0001s)
% Chan
1965 26,463 -- 1977 34,353 0.8
1966 26,897 1.6 1978 34,575 0.6
1967 26,988 0.3 1979 35,160 1.7
1968 27,276 1.1 1980 36,198 3.0
1969 28,254 3.6 1981 36,494 0.8
1970 29,252 3.5 1982 36,429 -0.2
1971 30,142 3.0 1983 36,201 -0.6
1972 30,777 2.1 1984 35,202 -2.8
1973 31,761 3.2 1985 33,501 -4.8
1974 32,943 3.7 1986 32,410 -3.3
1975 33,519 1.7 1987 31,633 -2.4
1976 34,068 1.6 1988 31,480 -0.5
Source: Hospital Statistics, 1966 thru 1989 eds. The
American Hospital Association; Chicago, Illinois: 
1966 thru 1989.
Hospital admissions increased steadily until the implementation of 
the PPS in October of 1983. The slight decrease in 1982 may be, in 
part, attributable to admission adjustments that the hospital industry 
began making early in preparation for DRG reimbursement. However, by 
curtailing non-acute admissions, hospitals did not have resource 
expenditures for which they would not be reimbursed.
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The second item on the agenda was to maximize the profitability of
each DRG reimbursement. Decreasing the patients' length of stay
(without compromising the quality of care) would allow the hospital to
retain more of the DRG payment as profit. (Or, if the hospital was
losing money on that DRG, they could reduce their loss). Prior to DRGs
and to the extent possible, hospitals often did not discharge a patient
until they could function with minimal assistance. After DRGs,
hospitals began a greater utilization of home care organizations and
short-term extended care facilities (which did not fall under the
2Prospective Payment System). This resulted in a decrease in the 
patients' average length of stay as shown in Table 4-2.
TABLE 4-2 —  AVERAGE LENGTH OF STAY (ALOS) IN U.S. HOSPITALS
1965 THRU 1988
Year ALOS % 
(days)
Change Year ALOS 
(days)
% Change
1965 7.8 -- 1977 7.6 -1.3
1966 7.9 1.3 1978 7.6 0
1967 8.3 5.1 1979 7.6 0
1968 8.4 1.2 1980 7.6 0
1969 8.3 -1.2 1981 7.6 0
1970 8.2 -1.2 1982 7.6 0
1971 8.0 -2.4 1983 7.6 0
1972 7.9 -1.3 1984 7.3 -3.9
1973 7.8 -1.3 1985 7.1 -2.7
1974 7.8 0 1986 7.1 0
1975 7.7 -1.3 1987 7.2 1.4











The table demonstrates an increase in the average length of stay 
from 1965 through 1968 and a slight decline in ALOS from 1969 through
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1977 with two years (1974 and 1976) with no change. However, with the
first year of DRG reimbursement (1984) the average length of stay, which
had stabilized at 7.6 days in 1978, immediately decreased in two
consecutive years, remained stable in the third year, slightly increased
in the fourth year, and stabilized again in the fifth year. The
interesting point here is that although the hospitals were admitting
patients whose intensity of illness was greater than in the years prior
to DRGs, the average length of stay has decreased as hospitals shifted
costs that they previously would have had to other health care 
2 3organizations. ' Thus, they were able to maximize the profitability of
the DRG payment.
The third item on the hospitals1 agenda was to look at ways to
curtail costs. Being a relatively labor intensive industry
(approximately 60% of the hospital industry's budget is for
1 2personnel) ' hospitals began to scrutinize their personnel needs.
Under the retrospective payment system, hospitals had no real constraint 
from adding personnel to their staffs because employees wages were 
automatically reimbursed as a cost for providing patient care. Now the 
question was: how many employees (R.N.'s, X-ray technicians, laboratory 
technicians, aides, L.P.N.'s, dietary personnel, etc.) did they really 
need to get the job done? Obviously, any savings the hospitals could 
realize by limiting the number of personnel they employed would help 
improve their financial bottom line.
Prior to DRGs, hospital employment was exceptionally steady and the 
industry rarely experienced overall staff reductions. Employee lay-offs 
(temporary or permanent) were practically never heard of. However, with 
the implementation of the Prospective Payment System which resulted in
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decreased admissions and declining lengths of stay, hospitals began 
decreasing personnel they believed were no longer necessary to its 
functioning through lay-offs and attrition. Initially, this caused 
some concern that the quality of patient care would decline. But, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, none of the several studies done since the 
implementation of the PPS has indicated that patients are receiving 
lessened quality of care.
Table 4-3 shows how hospitals' full-time equivalents (FTEs) have 
changed from 1965 through 1988.





% Change Year FTEs % 
(000s)
Change
1965 1,386 -- 1977 2,581 3.9
1966 1,532 10.5 1978 2,662 3 .1
1967 1,619 5.7 1979 2,762 3.8
1968 1,717 6.1 1980 2,879 4.2
1969 1,824 6.2 1981 3,039 5.6
1970 1,929 5.8 1982 3,110 2.3
1971 1,999 3.6 1983 3,102 -0.3
1972 2,056 2.9 1984 3,023 -2.5
1973 2,149 4.5 1985 3,003 -0.7
1974 2,289 6.5 1986 3,032 1.0
1975 2,399 4.8 1987 3,120 2.9
1976 2,483 3.5 1988 3,209 2.9
Source : Hospital 
American 
1966 thru
Statistics, 1966 thru 
Hospital Association; 
1989.
. 1989 eds. The 
Chicago, Illinoii
The table indicates a moderate increase in hospital full-time 
equivalents right up till 1983. Hospitals were, of course, 
knowledgeable about the introduction of DRG reimbursement for several 
months prior to the implementation of the PPS on October 1, 1983. It 
appears reasonable to assume that they spent much of 1983 determining
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how DRG reimbursement would affect their bottom line and reduced their 
full-time equivalents as October drew near. Noticeable increases in 
full-time equivalents occurred in the last three years. Reasons for 
these increases and their effect on hospital productivity will be 
explored shortly.
Hospitals' agendas included many additional items that they hoped
would make them profitable and allow them to survive. Endeavors
included affiliations in order to consolidate such activities as
payroll, purchasing, billing, etc., complete mergers, and purchasing or
beginning profitable enterprises such as home health care companies,
external laboratories, and extended care facilities. Individual
hospitals also opened psychiatric and rehabilitation units within the
hospital because, if approved, these units still reimbursed costs and
2could help the hospital remain financially viable.
The curtailment of non-acute admissions and the decline in the 
average length of stay have been emphasized because they have a direct 
relationship to the hospitals' need for personnel which represents the 
hospitals' largest single expenditure. The number of full-time 
equivalent personnel employed by hospitals also has a direct 
relationship on the industry's productivity - which is discussed next.
Aggregate Hospital Productivity
Productivity was defined in Chapter 3 as output per worked hour. 
Having defined the hospital industry's output as the discharged patient 
and substituting full-time equivalents for worked hours, the 
productivity of hospital employees can be determined by dividing the 
yearly discharges by the number of FTEs employed that year. Table 4-4
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indicates how hospital productivity has changed from 1965 trough 1988 
and Figure 4-1 is a graphic representation of the yearly percentage 
change in productivity.








1965 29,142 1,386 21.0 --
1966 29,596 1,532 19.3 -8.1
1967 29,590 1,619 18. 3 -5.2
1968 30,090 1,717 17.5 -4.4
1969 30,815 1,824 17 .4 -0.6
1970 32,124 1,929 16.7 -4.0
1971 33,360 1,999 16.7 0
1972 34,253 2,056 16.7 0
1973 35,819 2,149 16.7 0
1974 37,266 2,289 16.3 -2.4
1975 38,159 2,399 15 .9 -2.5
1976 38,880 2,483 15.7 -1.3
1977 39,288 2,581 15 .2 -3.2
1978 39,617 2,662 14.9 -2.0
1979 40,562 2,762 14 .7 -1.3
1980 41,666 2,879 14.5 -1.4
1981 41,844 3 ,039 13.8 -4.8
1982 42,111 3,110 13.5 -2.2
1983 41,945 3,102 13.5 0
1984 41,261 3,023 13.6 0.7
1985 40,201 3,003 13 .4 -1.5
1986 39,755 3,032 13 .1 -2.2
1987 39,541 3,120 12 .7 -3 .1
1988 40,236 3,209 12.5 -1.6
*Includes the AHA's formulary adjustment to outpatient 
visits so that they can be equated with in-patient stays
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At an initial glance, Table 4-4 and Figure 4-1 indicate that 
hospital productivity, with few exceptions, has been continually 
declining from a high of 21.0 discharges per FTE in 1965 to a low of 
12.5 in 1988. 1970 through 1973 as well as 1982-83 posted neither an
increase nor a decrease in hospital productivity. 1984, the first full 
year of DRG reimbursement, is the only year to register a gain in 
productivity. In addition, Figure 4-1 seems to indicate that the rate 
of change in hospital productivity has fluctuated somewhat erratically. 
Finally, the hospital industry has been increasing its full-time 
equivalents despite a declining number of discharged patients (except 
for a 1.8% increase in discharges in 1988) and stable or decreasing 
lengths of stay (except for a 1.4% increase in 1987 as seen in Table 
4-2).
There are a few historical events that took place during these 
years that may help put things in perspective. First, the Social 
Security Act of 1966 included Medicare which provided hospitalization 
insurance for millions of Americans who previously had had none. For
71
the next four years hospitals did not increase their staffing as fast as 
they were experiencing an increase in their patient load. Thus, there 
was a noticeable decreasing rate in productivity losses.4
Second, President Nixon's Economic Stabilization Policy was in
effect from early 1971 through mid 1974. Wages and prices were
temporarily frozen which was followed by a strong plea for voluntary
constraint. Hospital productivity remained unchanged during this
4 Speriod. Why this occurred has not been discernible. ' '
Third, the first full year of DRG reimbursement was 1984 and that 
is the only year that has shown an increase in hospital productivity.
The prior year's productivity remained unchanged as hospitals prepared 
to meet the financial restraints imposed by the Prospective Payment 
System. The following three years had increasing losses in productivity 
while the fourth year had a decrease in the rate of productivity loss. 
Since the implementation of DRGs, the hospitals appear to have been able 
to keep the losses in productivity more tightly clustered (as seen in 
Figure 4-1). However, DRGs were supposed to provide hospitals with an 
incentive to become more productive. Has this incentive failed?
At issue here is whether the aggregate data are sensitive enough to 
account for the changing acuity of care needs with which patients 
present themselves to hospitals. No one disputes that the intensity of 
patient care has increased since PPS and DRGs changed how hospitals were 
reimbursed and that the level of intensity has fluctuated from year to 
year.4'5,6. Because hospitals are no longer reimbursed for non-acute 
patient care, physicians and clinics have been treating non-acute 
patients in non-hospital settings. Therefore, the patients that 
physicians do refer to the hospital for treatment are collectively more
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critically ill than in prior years and this in turn requires a larger
4 5 6expenditure of medical resources per patient. ' ' ' Hospitals and
hospital associations have been unable to come to an agreement with the
Prospective Payment System or the Health Care Financing Administration
on how to account for the increased intensity of care. Hospitals
believe that their personal experience in providing patient care
indicates an intensity of care level that is greater than the DRG
4reimbursement allows. The issue remains unresolved.
A second problem with the aggregate data is the American Hospital 
Association's formula that incorporates outpatient visits into an 
equivalent in-patient stay. The formula is arbitrary and prior to 1983 
counted every three outpatients as an equivalent in-patient. In 1983 it 
was changed to dividing total outpatient costs by the average cost of 
all in-patients and adding the quotient to the year's inpatient 
discharges. In other words, it is currently an attempt to equilibrate 
outpatient visits to an in-patient stay through the expenditure of 
dollars. It is questionable that either formula accurately measures 
medical resource utilization by outpatients that makes it equivalent to 
in-patient's usage. Therefore, total discharges becomes an arbitrary 
figure as opposed to an accurate measurement. Obviously, any increase 
or decrease in total discharges effects productivity positively or 
negatively. A more sensitive indicator for outpatient visits is
certainly needed.
What is clear, however, is that a discharged patient under the 
Prospective Payment System does use more medical resources (including 
personnel) than did a patient prior to PPS. In other words, the 
utilization of discharges (as currently used) to compare productivity
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between the retrospective payment system with the PPS is not exactly
comparing apples to apples. The use of any acuity index would cause the
hospital industry's productivity to respond more favorably to DRG
reimbursement. However, neither an accurate nor acceptable acuity index
4has been developed. Additionally, any change in the methodology of 
equilibrating outpatients to in-patients would cause productivity to
4increase or decrease. These problems with the aggregate data are 
undoubtedly due in part to the "newness" of the PPS and the limited time 
frame that the industry has had to make adjustments. Nonetheless, 
assuming that an acuity index would cause the hospital industry's 
productivity losses to be at a rate less than shown in Table 4-4 and 
Figure 4-1 (and possibly could be positive) since DRG reimbursement, it 
appears to be reasonable to assume that hospital productivity has 
actually responded somewhat favorably to the PPS. Correcting outpatient 
visits to accurately equilibrate with in-patient stays will also affect 
productivity but it is uncertain what this affect would be. Therefore, 
an accurate measurement of the hospital industry's productivity response 
to DRG reimbursement is currently undeterminable. It is anticipated 
that the data will become more reliable as the Prospective Payment 
System refines its policies and procedures. This is not meant to 
indicate, however, that the hospital industry should discontinue its 
search for processes that would improve its productivity.
Aggregate Hospital Efficiency
Efficiency, although often used in conjunction with productivity, 
is, as defined in Chapter 3, the least cost method of producing a 
product. The hospital industry's product has already been defined as
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the discharged patient. Dividing the hospital industry's total yearly 
expenses by the yearly discharges will provide cost per discharge. 
Comparing the yearly cost per discharge and the yearly rates of change 
will determine if the hospital industry has become more efficient as a 
result of the implementation of the Prospective Payment System.
Table 4-5 shows how hospital efficiency has changed from 1965 
through 1988 and Figure 4-2 graphically illustrates the yearly 
percentage of change in efficiency.
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Both Table 4-5 and Figure 4-2 show that they yearly costs per
discharge have fluctuated dramatically over the years. Prior to DRG
reimbursement there was no incentive to contain costs. As a result,
costs fluctuated wildly and were frequently 2, 3, and close to 4 times
7the Consumer Price Index. Since the implementation of the Prospective 
Payment System, however, there has been a noticeable change. The first 
full year of DRG reimbursement saw only single digit increases in the 
cost per discharge as it increased only 7.7% over 1983. Each of the 
next two years has less than a 1% increase over the prior year and 
continued to remain in single digits. The last two years have had a 
slight decrease.
The same historical events that effected productivity have effected 
the efficiency measurement of cost per discharge. With the passage of 
Medicare, the demand for hospital services increased resulting in high 
rates of increase in the cost per discharge from 1966 through 1970. The 
Economic Stabilization Policy held the yearly increases relatively 
stable. When the controls were lifted in 1974 the rate of increase 
varied dramatically until 1984 and the implementation of the Prospective
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Payment System. Figure 4-2 demonstrates that the cost per discharge has 
been more tightly clustered during DRG reimbursement than at any other 
time since 1965.
Additionally, the data suffer from the same difficulties discussed 
regarding hospital productivity. Total discharges do not reflect the 
increase in the intensity of care provided and are subject to an 
arbitrary outpatient formula that attempts to equilibrate these visit to 
an in-patient stay.^
Again, any accounting for the increase in patient acuity would
cause the cost per discharge to increase at a lesser rate than Table 4-5
shows. However, it is uncertain what an accurate equilibration of
outpatient visits to in-patient stays would do to the cost per
discharge. It is probable that any adjustment in the outpatient formula
4could cause an increase or decrease in efficiency.
It appears reasonable to assume from Figure 4-2 and the tighter 
cluster of points since DRG reimbursement, that the hospital industry 
has become somewhat more efficient since the implementation of the PPS. 
Unfortunately, an exact change in efficiency in not determinable from 
the data that is currently available.5,6.
Is it possible to glean any insight into the hospital industry's 
productivity and efficiency levels from the available data even though 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS
It is apparent from the data presented that the retrospective 
payment system could not continue operating in an unrestrained capacity. 
The system provided the hospital industry with no cost constraints.
What motivation is there for any industry or individual to contain costs 
when whatever they spend is automatically reimbursed? To draw an 
analogy, if every citizen in the United States was reimbursed by the 
government for their monthly housing expenses, the majority of us would 
undoubtedly have housing expenses that would exceed our current monthly 
costs. There would be nothing restraining us from continually moving 
into more luxurious homes with more and more amenities as they became 
available. As the government's outlay for monthly housing expenses 
became increasingly greater, grew far more rapidly than overall 
inflation, and became unmanageable, the government would begin to cry 
for cost containment. The citizens, fearing there may be a limiting of 
monthly housing reimbursement, would limit an amenity here or there and 
reduce the hours of the gardener, housekeeper, maid, and other household 
help believing they were doing their part to cut down on costs not 
realizing that as they continued to "keep up with the Joneses" monthly 
housing expenses would continue to increase. Eventually, the government 
would cry "uncle" and have a Prospective Payment System for Housing 
limiting the construction of new homes and forcing home owners to 
contain costs on amenities and household help.
The scenario presented in this analogy demonstrates that in the 
absence of the economic forces of supply and demand price does not
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function as an incentive to equate marginal benefits with marginal 
costs. Thus, the apparent need for some external constraints to prevent 
a cost reimbursed commodity from becoming overwhelmingly and 
prohibitively expensive is demonstrated. The Prospective Payment System 
with DRG reimbursement, implemented in 1983, has attempted to do this 
with the hospital industry.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to accurately determine the 
changes that have occurred regarding productivity and efficiency within 
the hospital industry as a result of the PPS because the available data 
lacks certain characteristics to do so. These characteristics include 
the acuity of patient care and equating outpatient visits to in-patient 
stays. The hospitals' product, discharges, has undergone an increase in 
the level of acuity that no one disputes but on which the is also no 
general agreement. Additionally, the methodology of counting outpatient 
visits to equate to an in-patient stay is arbitrary and no one really
knows for certain that it does what it is designed to do. Therefore,
very little can be determined about the effect of the PPS on hospital 
productivity and efficiency.
Hypothetically, it can be estimated what would have happened to the 
hospital industry's productivity and efficiency had DRG reimbursement 
not been implemented. Using linear regression and the years 1979 
through 1982 as the base years, it is possible to to determine what 
19831s discharges per full-time equivalent and cost per discharge might 
have been. 1980 through 1983's figures can then be used to estimate
1984 and so forth.
On the next page, Tables 4-4 and 4-5 are partially reproduced for
the years in question and Figures 4-1 and 4-2 have also been duplicated.
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In the Tables, the columns in bold type indicate the linear regression 
estimate of what the hospital industry's productivity and efficiency 
levels as well as what the percentage of change might have been without 
DRG reimbursement. The red line in both figures is the graphic 
representation of these estimates.
TABLE 4-4 —  U.S. HOSPITAL PRODUCTIVITY 1965 THRU 1988





1982 13 .5 -2.2
1983 13.5 13.0 0 -3.7
1984 13 .6 12.5 0.7 -3.8
1985 13 .4 12.1 -1.5 -3.2
1986 13.1 11.6 -2.2 -4.1
1987 12.7 10.9 -3.1 -6.0
1988 12.5 10.5 -1.6 -3.7
















TABLE 4-5 —  U.S. HOSPITAL COST PER DISCHARGE 1965 THRU 1988
Year Cost/Discharge % Change
1979 $1,631.67 10.8
1980 1,847.31 13 .2
1981 2,168.51 17 .4
1982 2,495.64 15. 1
1983 2,780.59 $2,764.06 11.4 10.8
1984 2,994.35 3,088.23 7.7 11.7
1985 3,251.16 3,386.01 8.6 9.6
1986 3,544.38 3,682.31 9.3 8.8
1987 3,867.10 3,993.30 9.1 8.5
1988 4,198.75 4,290.36 8.5 7.4
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From the above tables and graphs, it appears reasonable to assume 
that hospital productivity would have continued decreasing at an 
accelerated rate without the Prospective Payment System's intervention. 
DRG reimbursement appears to have had a positive effect of productivity. 
The exact extent of this effect, however, is not really known. It also 
appears that the effect on cost per discharge has been positive although 
the percentage of change may have been a little less in the latter years 
without DRG reimbursement. Here again, though, the exact effect can not 
be accurately determined.
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Since its implementation, DRG reimbursement has undergone a number 
of changes. Originally, there were 467 DRGs. These have been expanded 
to 490 for Fiscal 1991. Furthermore, adjustments have also been made to 
the weighted index. As the Prospective Payment System is refined to 
include a generally accepted accounting of acuity and a verified 
methodology of equating outpatient visits to an in-patient stay, future 
studies regarding hospital productivity and efficiency may be able to 
more accurately assess the impact of DRG reimbursement. Additionally, 
studies of specific DRGs within a Major Disease Category may provide 
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